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INTERPARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION AND THE SIMPLIFIED REVISION 
PROCEDURES  
 
Katarzyna Granat
*
 
This contribution deals with the role of national parliaments in the simplified revision procedures 
under Art. 48(6) and 48(7) TEU and analyses the possibilities of interparliamentary cooperation 
within this area. The chapter first describes the relevant provisions in the Treaties highlighting 
the involvement of national parliaments. It then describes in detail the national procedures 
implementing the simplified revision procedures in selected member states. The chapter then 
moves on to focus on the effects of Art. 48(6) and 48(7) TEU for interparliamentary cooperation, 
illustrating this particular aspect using the amendment of Article 136 TFEU as a case study. 
Finally, the chapter investigates the potential implications of interparliamentary cooperation in 
simplified treaty revisions for the overall good functioning of the EU (Art. 12 TEU). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In contrast with the past, the Lisbon Treaty sought to address the issue of amendments of the 
Treaties by linking the aspiration that all institutions should be included as the EU changes with 
the difficulties that this can pose in the enlarged EU of twenty-eight member states.
1
 Moreover 
the ‘democratic deficit’ concerns at the time led to the inclusion of the Convention and national 
parliaments in the revision procedure helping to ‘democratize’ future reform projects.2 Article 48 
TEU reflects these ideas by providing for two processes: ordinary and simplified revision 
procedures. The latter one, which is the subject of this contribution, is a novel procedure and 
simplified in the sense that it does not demand calling a Convention or an intergovernmental 
conference and aims at accelerating Treaty revisions,
3
 and at the same time brings 
‘democratization’ by involving national parliaments.  
In fact, national parliaments were involved in the amendment procedure since the Treaty on the 
European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992, demanded ratification by the Member States ‘in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’4 In addition, the representatives of 
national parliaments participated in the works of the European Convention entrusted with the 
preparation of a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
5
 However, the novelty of the 
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Lisbon Treaty in this respect can be seen not only in the new types of revision procedures, but it 
in the direct highlighting of the involvement of national parliaments in the amendment of the 
Treaties. Specifically, Article 12(d) TEU states that ‘national Parliaments contribute actively to 
the good functioning of the Union by taking part in the revision procedures of the Treaties, in 
accordance with Article 48 of this Treaty’.  
Under Article 48(6) TEU national parliaments participate in simplified revision procedures when 
their approval is demanded in accordance with the constitutional requirements of the Member 
States for the entry into force of European Council decisions. Under Article 48(7) TEU national 
parliaments may oppose a European Council initiative that would allow an act to be adopted 
according to procedures other than those laid down in the Treaties, specifically allowing the 
Council to act by qualified majority instead of unanimity or switch from special to ordinary 
legislative procedure. 
While the participation of national parliaments in the Early Warning System (EWS) established 
in Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty seems to be the main new source of involvement of 
national parliaments at the EU level and the one on which the most academic research is focused 
on,
6
 this chapter will inquire into the functions of national legislators within the treaty revision 
procedures. The design of these procedures in the Lisbon Treaty allows a single national 
parliament to veto the amendment when the amendment has to be approved according to national 
procedures that involve an agreement of the parliament or to oppose the so-called general 
passerelle. These options show the individual character of the involvement of national 
parliaments. In this respect, this chapter will give an overview of simplified revision procedures 
in selected member states: the UK, Germany, Poland, Italy and France. This sample reflects 
different patterns of parliamentary control of European Council meetings.
7
 Although this chapter 
does not directly deal with the control of the European Council decisions, they are central for the 
simplified treaty revision and the strength of parliamentary control of those acts might be 
reflected in the design of national procedures of parliamentary involvement in the simplified 
revision procedures. This chapter will also inquire whether the involvement of national 
parliaments shows any potential for cooperation between national parliaments. In consequence, 
this chapter will reflect whether the participation of national parliaments in the simplified treaty 
revisions and interparliamentary cooperation on the very same field create a synergy contributing 
to the good functioning of the EU as proclaimed by Article 12 TEU. 
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II. SIMPLIFIED REVISION PROCEDURES IN THE LISBON TREATY  
The new, simplified type of treaty revision procedures are anchored in Article 48 TEU. They 
were first proposed in the same form in the Constitutional Treaty.
8
 The following sections give a 
brief overview of the procedures. 
First, Article 48(6) TEU provides that a member state government, the European Parliament (EP) 
or the Commission may put forward a proposal in the European Council to revise all or part of 
the provisions of Part Three of the TFEU, which is a major section relating to the internal 
policies and action of the Union. This type of amendment is hence excluded, for example with 
regard to provisions concerning EU principles; provisions on non-discrimination and citizenship; 
or those concerning association of the EU with the overseas countries and the Union’s external 
action. The relevant decision to amend the Treaties is adopted unanimously by the European 
Council after consulting the EP and the Commission and, if the amendment at stake concerns the 
monetary area, the European Central Bank (ECB). Importantly, the decision of the European 
Council ‘shall not increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties’. The 
European Council decision does not enter into force ‘until it is approved by the Member States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’.9 
According to De Witte, ‘the European founding treaties distinguish themselves from the usual 
multilateral treaties by the express mention (in Art. 48 [TEU]) that ratification of a treaty 
amendment must happen “in accordance with constitutional requirements” of the parties’.10 The 
rationale for this provision is to guarantee ‘the protection of the national constitutional division 
of powers which the governments cannot set aside’.11 Without the Article 48 TEU procedure, as 
De Witte argues, the national governments could have amended the Treaties informally by an 
‘“ordinary” parallel agreement’ and hence could have omitted European constitutional 
guarantees expressed in Article 48 TEU (the participation of the national parliament).
12
 In 
addition, if the national governments would not follow Article 48 TEU they would act in the 
violation of national constitutional law requiring the approval of the national legislature.
13
  
Member States’ ratification procedures tend to share the same elements, such as referendum or 
parliamentary authorization to ratify which allows the parliament to control the authority capable 
to sign the treaty (the executive).
14
 The vote in parliament is in fact, as Closa puts it, ‘an 
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inalienable component of ratification procedures,’ and although the parliaments cannot make 
reservations on EU treaties, the possibility that a national parliament will refuse to grant 
authorization hangs over the negotiations process.
15
 Nonetheless, the data on the EU Treaty 
ratification process shows that neither such variables as different positions on EU integration 
within the coalition government, qualified majorities necessary to authorize the ratification, nor 
the participation of a second chamber, nor a change of parliamentary majority through an 
intervening election have been a hurdle in the ratification process in the past.
16
 Hence while 
parliaments are a participant of the ratification process, they are not the obvious veto-player 
suspects. 
Second, Article 48(7) TEU establishes the so-called general passerelle,
17
 which was first 
proposed in the Constitutional Treaty.
18
 De Witte labels the procedure of general passerelle a 
‘genuine measure of flexibility in treaty amendment,’ since it allows for a ‘further deepening of 
integration (…) without the need for setting up an IGC and, above all, without the need for 
constitutional ratification of these changes by all the Member States separately’.19 Specifically, 
the European Council, acting by unanimity and with the consent of the absolute majority of the 
EP,
20
 may decide to authorise the Council to change its decision-making procedure from 
unanimity to a vote by qualified majority. This change may concern the areas provided in the 
TFEU and Title V of TEU regarding the EU’s external action and Common Foreign and Security 
Policy.
21
 This type of revision has hence a broader scope than Article 48(6) TEU procedure. 
Similarly, the European Council may decide that a legislative act is adopted under the ordinary 
legislative procedure instead of the special legislative procedure (applicable to the TFEU 
provisions).
22
 
 
The general passerelle explicitly embraces a role for national parliaments. First, both Article 
48(7)(3) TEU and Article 6 of Protocol No.1 grant national parliaments information rights on the 
planned use of the general passerelle. Specifically, the European Council is obliged to notify 
national parliaments of its intention to adopt an act according to a changed procedure a minimum 
six months before the European Council adopts its decision. Within six months of the 
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notification date, a national parliament may oppose the initiative of the European Council and in 
this case the decision at stake will not be adopted. To be clear, Article 48(7)(3) TEU describes 
the opposition by a national parliament to the European Council initiative – not to the decision. 
The decision is adopted only after the six month period has elapsed and if national parliaments 
did not oppose the initiative. Hence between the notification to parliaments and the end of the six 
month period for parliaments’ opposition the document at stake is a draft European Council 
decision, since the European Council may adopt the decision only in the absence of opposition.  
 
So far, Article 48 TEU has been applied three times for amendments of the Treaties. The 
ordinary revision procedure was used both for the amendment of Protocol No. 36 with regard to 
additional seats in the EP for the period of the 2009-2014 parliamentary term
23
 and in order to 
add Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon (‘Irish Protocol’) to the 
TEU and TFEU.
24
 The only simplified treaty revision so far took place for the amendment of 
Article 136 TFEU and will be studied in more detail below. 
The design of Article 48(6) and 48(7) TEU grants a role to national parliaments at the final stage 
of the revision procedure. In contrast, the ordinary revision procedure allows for a direct 
involvement of the representatives of the national parliaments in the examining of the 
amendments proposed to the Treaties in cases when the Convention is convened.
25
 This 
characteristic of the Convention method of treaty revision is arguably increasing the input 
legitimacy of the EU by decreasing the lines of accountability between the citizen and the agents 
conducting the negotiations and enhancing the number of represented interests.
26
 
Some differences between Article 48(6) TEU and the general passerelle should be also noted. 
For example Kiiver points out that the Article 48(7) TEU procedure ‘is not strictly speaking a 
ratification of a Treaty amendment but a veto right against a Treaty amendment’ in contrast to 
the ratification (ordinary revision procedure) or approval (simplified revision procedure) carried 
out by the Member States ‘in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’.27 It is 
hence argued by some authors that since Article 48(7) TEU does not demand a ‘positive 
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approval’ of the European Council decision it is further from a classic conclusion of international 
treaties, although ultimately the revision still depends on the willingness of each member state.
28
 
III OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN 
THE TREATY REVISION 
   
The aim of this section is to show in greater detail how the simplified revision procedures are 
structured in selected member states: the UK, Germany, Poland, Italy and France. The inquiry 
into these five member states is justified by the different patterns of parliamentary control of 
European Council meetings put forward in a study led by Wolfgang Wessels.
29
 Although this 
chapter does not directly concern the control of the European Council decisions, those decisions 
are at the center of the simplified treaty revision and the strength of parliamentary control of 
those acts might be reflected in the design of national procedures of parliamentary involvement 
in the simplified revision procedures. Accordingly, Poland represents the ‘Europe as usual’ 
model, which follows on the system of scrutiny established for ordinary legislation. The UK 
exemplifies the ‘government accountability’ model, centered on plenary sessions after the 
summits to question the government policy. France is located between an ‘expert’ model of 
scrutiny based on an ex-ante and ex-post control by European Affairs Committees and the 
‘policy maker’ represented by Germany, which emphasizes the ex-ante control. Finally, Italy 
with the new scrutiny powers of the parliament over the European Council meeting represents 
the strongest model of scrutiny.
 30
 The next sections give an overview of the national procedures 
for the Treaty amendment in the chosen Member States and whether they correspond with the 
strength of those parliaments in the scrutiny of European Council decisions. 
In the UK, the European Union Act 2011 regulates in great detail the national procedure for the 
simplified treaty revision in Article 48(6) and (7) TEU. With regard to Article 48(6) TEU, 
Section 3(1) of the European Union Act provides that the decision of the European Council has 
to be approved by Act of Parliament (statute) and in the referendum.
31
 With regard to the 
revision procedure under Article 48(7) TEU, Section 6(1) of the European Union Act demands 
that before the Minister of the Crown votes in favour of the European Council decision, the draft 
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decision must be approved by Act of Parliament (statute) and in a referendum.
32
 The 
requirements are hence identical for both procedures of simplified treaty revision. The relevant 
distinction is that in Article 48(6) TEU procedure the parliament is involved only after the 
European Council decision is taken and needs to be approved by the Member States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, while under the Article 48(7) TEU 
procedure the parliament has to approve the draft decision before the prime minister votes in 
favour of it in the European Council. This is connected to the fact that, as Paul Craig explains, 
the ‘strategy’ of the framers of the European Union Act was to introduce the approval by Act of 
Parliament or referendum as a ‘pre-condition’ for the general passerelle.33 In this situation 
however, the right to oppose to the European Council initiative granted by Article 48(7)(3) 
TEU‘is unlikely to be needed,’ and hence no national provisions have been introduced for this 
procedure.
34
 Indeed, it seems rather improbable that the parliament would use the veto after 
approving a draft decision in an Act of Parliament, unless the political majorities at stake would 
change, which is improbable taking into account the short six month period foreseen for the 
parliaments.  
In Germany, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have to be informed about the revisions of the 
Treaties. Specifically, §9(1) of the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the 
German Bundestag in matters concerning the European Union (EUZBBG)
35
 states that the 
Bundestag has a right to deliver an opinion on proposals and initiatives for decisions on the 
opening of negotiations to make amendments to EU Treaties. Moreover, before the final decision 
on the treaty amendment is taken, the federal government should ‘reach an agreement with the 
Bundestag’. Knowing the opinion of the Bundestag, the federal government may however take a 
divergent decision justified by good reasons of foreign or integration policy.
36
 Similarly, the 
Annex to §9(1) of the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German 
Länder in Matters concerning the European Union (EUZBLG) indicates with regard to Article 48 
TEU in general that the federal government informs the Bundesrat about its position and about 
the further negations as far as the interests of the Länder are at stake.
37
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The procedure for approval of the simplified treaty revision is further specified in the German 
Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz of 2009  (Responsibility for Integration Law).
38
 With regard to 
the Article 48(6) TEU procedure §2 IntVG provides that a statute (Gesetz) in accordance with 
Article 23(1) of German Basic Law is necessary for the approval of European Council decisions. 
In short, approval by the Bundestag together with the consent of the Bundesrat is necessary. 
For the Article 48(7) TEU procedure, according to §4(1) IntVG an approval of the parliament in 
form of statute is necessary before the German representative approves or rejects the European 
Council initiative. Without such statute, the German representative in the European Council is 
obliged to reject the European Council initiative. This regulation is hence similar to the British 
one. This solution is due to the Lisbon judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
which indicated that the right of national parliaments to oppose a passerelle under Article 
48(7)(3) TEU ‘is not a sufficient equivalent of the requirement of ratification; therefore the 
approval by the representative of the German government always requires a law within the 
meaning of Article 23.1 second sentence, and if necessary third sentence, of the Basic Law. It is 
only in this way that the German legislative bodies exercise their responsibility for integration in 
a given case and also decide whether the level of democratic legitimation is still high enough to 
accept the majority decision’.39 
German law distinguishes however between the statute necessary for the consent or rejection by 
the German representative to the European Council decision
40
and the self-standing right of the 
German parliamentary chambers to oppose the European Council’s initiative.41 Specifically, 
§10(1) IntVG states that (only) the Bundestag may oppose the general passerelle when the 
initiative touches upon exclusive competences of the Bund.
42
In all other cases, meaning those 
not concerning the exclusive competences of the federation, German law allows both the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat to oppose the amendment at stake, without requiring any common 
position. Subsequently, the President of the Bundestag or of the Bundesrat accordingly informs 
the President of the European Council about the opposition and notifies the German government 
about this.
43
 
In Poland, any decision of the European Council according to Article 48(6) TEU demands 
ratification.
44
The Polish Constitution provides for three types of ratification procedure; among 
those two demanding the prior agreement of the parliament expressed in a statute and one which 
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does not require such approval. These two procedures are relevant here since they relate to 
international treaties concerning Poland’s membership of an international organization or 
conferrals of competences of organs of State authority in some matters to an international 
organization.
45
 
With regard to the general passerelle, both chambers of the parliament have to agree to it in a 
statute.
46
 Accordingly, a motion of the government based on the parliament’s statute is passed to 
the President of Poland who takes the decision on Poland’s position in the case at stake. This 
motion obliges the government’s representative in the European Council to vote in favour of the 
European Council initiative or to abstain from the vote. If the President does not take any 
decision on the position of Poland, the Polish representative in the European Council should 
reject the European Council initiative. Hence, there is no possibility that the Polish representative 
in the European Council will vote in a way that the Polish parliament did not approve of. If the 
President did not take any decision, it would have the same effect as parliament’s opposition. 
The only problematic case is when the parliament is in favour of the amendment but the 
President takes no action and hence the representative would have to vote against. Yet, some 
indication on how such cases could be solved gives the Constitutional Tribunal which decided 
that although the Polish Constitution designates the President as ‘the supreme representative of 
the Republic of Poland and the guarantor of the continuity of State authority’ the President and 
the national government should cooperate with regard to the position of Poland during the 
meetings of the European Council to ensure uniformity in relations with the EU and its 
institutions.
47
   
The right to oppose a European Council decision is regulated separately in the Rules of 
Procedures of both chambers of the Polish Parliament. In the Sejm, the initiative to raise the veto 
remains with the European Affairs Committee but the final decision is taken by the plenary.
48
 In 
the Senat, the relevant parliamentary committee prepares an opinion which is then also discussed 
and voted onin the plenary.
49
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In consequence, similar to the German one, the Polish system offers both the necessity that the 
parliament agrees to the passerelle in a statute before the vote in the European Council as well as 
a direct repetition of the treaty provisions granting parliaments a possibility to raise their 
opposition.  
In Italy the new Legge 234/2012 on Italy’s participation in EU affairs mandates that the 
government informs both chambers of parliament about initiatives concerning the simplified 
revision procedure according to Article 48(6) and (7) TEU.
50
 If the European Council decision 
demands a prior approval of the member states according to their constitutional rules, the Italian 
government transmits such a decision to then be approved by the chambers.
51
 Specifically, with 
regard to the Article 48(6) TEU procedure the government submits within 30 days of the 
European Council decision to the chambers a draft of a statute approving the decision of the 
European Council.
52
 According to Article 80 of the Italian Constitution, the parliamentary 
chambers authorize in form of a statute the ratification of international treaties and no 
referendum is admissible for laws authorizing the ratification of international treaties as per 
Article 75 of the Constitution. 
With regard to the general passerelle, the Italian provisions repeat the text of Article 48(7) TEU 
by stating that the parliamentary chambers should take the decision within six months from the 
moment of the transmission of the act at stake.
53
 In case of a negative decision of both chambers, 
the chambers should inform the European Council and the government of their decision. Hence, 
different to Germany, the UK and Poland, the Italian parliament has only its Treaty right to 
oppose to the passerelle, but prior agreement of the parliament in form of a statute is not 
necessary for the approval of the decision in the European Council by the Italian representative. 
In France, Article 88(7) of the French Constitution grants the National Assembly and the Senate 
the right to oppose ‘any modification of the rules governing the passing of acts of the European 
Union in cases provided for under the simplified revision procedure for treaties’. This provision 
was added as a consequence of the Lisbon decision of the French Constitutional Council,
54
 
which followed the reasons of its prior decision on the Constitutional Treaty. Specifically, with 
regard to Article IV-445 of the Constitutional Treaty (Article 48(6) TEU) the Council identified 
the parliamentary authorization according to Article 53 of the French Constitution as the 
approval demanded ‘in accordance with the respective constitutional requirements of the 
member states’.55 Article 53 of the French Constitution provides for an approval of EU Treaties 
by an act of parliament.  
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With regard to Article 48(7) TEU (Article IV-444 of the Constitutional Treaty) the decision of 
the French Constitutional Council mandates that constitutional amendment is necessary ‘in the 
absence of any national ratification procedure making it possible to review the constitutionality 
of said laws’;56 and in ‘order to allow [the parliament] to exercise its prerogative’.57 The 
particularities of the right to oppose are indicated in the Rules of Procedure of the National 
Assembly and of the Senate. In the Assembly, the motion opposing to the passerelle must be 
signed by at least one tenth of the members of the chamber within 6 months of the transmission 
of the initiative,
58
 while in the Senate any senator may table a motion to oppose a European 
Council initiative within 4 months of its transmission to the chamber.
59
 To pass, the motion to 
oppose has to be adopted by each of the chambers and in case of rejection, no motion against the 
same initiative can be drafted again in the Assembly or Senate.
60
 Hence, the right of the French 
parliament to oppose demands an agreement of both chambers of the parliament, which is also 
clearly stated in the French Constitution. 
In sum, France, similar to Italy, does not demand a prior approval by statute before the 
representative votes in the European Council. Moreover, in the same vein as Italian law, the 
French provisions demand a joint decision of the chambers to veto the general passerelle. 
The examples studied here show some significant differences in the regulation of the simplified 
treaty revision procedure at the national level. While with regard to Article 48(6) TEU the 
revision of the Treaties demands consent of parliament in all cases (or referendum as in the UK), 
the main differences concern the general passerelle procedure. These include the necessary 
consent of the parliament needed for the initiative to be approved by the national representative 
in the European Council (the UK, Germany, Poland) or whether an opposition to that European 
Council initiative is regulated at the national level. The latter aspect is present in Italy and 
France, but also in Germany and in Poland which hence exhibit both types of safeguards in a 
form of a parliamentary statute and as an opposition. Moreover, national regulations differ on 
whether a joint decision of the chambers is necessary for the opposition. 
The national regulations explored in this chapter prove that there is some link between the 
practice of scrutiny of European Council summits and the necessity of an act of parliament 
allowing the executive to vote in favour of the passerelle in the European Council. For example, 
the ‘policy maker’ model of the German parliament explains the additional safeguard in a form 
of a statute granted to this parliament, similarly as in the UK which is based on the governmental 
accountability to the parliament. In Poland which exhibits the weak ‘Europe as usual’ model, a 
prior statute is necessary, which means that for a passerelle an additional hurdle was put in place. 
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In Italy, on the contrary, the strong ex ante and ex post scrutiny of European Council decisions 
may seem to be a sufficient safeguard and hence there is no requirement of a prior statute in 
Italy. This reasoning might be similar for the lack of prior statute in France, which places itself 
not far from Italy in Wessel’s model. In sum, because the stronger models of oversight of 
European Council decisions (Germany and Italy), as well the weaker ones (Poland, the UK and 
France) have taken different approaches to the prior statute requirement, there does not seem to 
be much of an overlap with the categories of Wessel’s study. Hence, the passerelle might present 
a very special case of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs. 
The broader explanation of the additional safeguards might be however connected with the view 
of the German Constitutional Court in the Lisbon judgment that ‘[i]t would be incompatible with 
the constitutional requirement of a parliamentary decision if the requirement of a time-limit 
could construe in concrete terms the possible silence on the part of the legislative bodies as their 
approval’.61 In other words, the principle of parliamentary involvement requires active, explicit 
approval by the legislatures in order to allow to the government to support the revision of the 
treaty. This argument of the German Court could also be behind the procedures introduced in the 
UK and in Poland.  
Under Article 48(7) TEU, the paradox of providing for both the statute necessary for the 
approval or rejection of the decision in the European Council (stemming from national law) and 
the right to opposition (stemming from EU law but specified in national law) is that the former 
‘consumes’ the latter. If a statute is necessary for the approval of a European Council decision by 
the member of the executive, then there is no need for the parliament to have a separate right to 
oppose European Council initiatives. In other words the parliament may express its opposition 
simply by not giving its consent in the form of the statute necessary for the German 
representative to vote in favour. There is basically no chance that the parliament grants a consent 
for a national representative to vote in favour of adoption of the European Council decision when 
it would also plan to use its right to oppose expressed in Article 48(7)(3). The main difference 
here is arguably ‘psychological’: where a statute is needed for the vote of the representative in 
the European Council, it will be still the head of state or government that vetoed the passerelle. 
This is also typical to many decisions taken under unanimity in the legislative process. In 
contrast the right to oppose comes from the parliament directly, which adds drama, as is the 
institution democratically linked directly with its citizens. 
The final remark concerns the notion of ‘national parliament’ applied in Article 48(7) TEU. In 
contrast to the possibility of issuing reasoned opinions under the EWS, which explicitly grants 
such a right to a national parliament and to a chamber thereof, the general passerelle indicates 
that a national parliament may oppose a European Council initiative. In consequence it seems 
that in the case of bicameral parliaments (see the example of France and Italy above) a joint 
                                                           
61
Bundesverfassungsgericht (n 39) para 320. 
Comment [KG9]: I changed this 
paragraph a bit to reflect how 
Wessel’s model interacts with the 
procedures for passerelle 
13 
 
opinion of both chambers is necessary.
62
 On the contrary, in some of Member States there is 
explicitly no plan to adopt a joint position at all (the Netherlands),
63
 or national provisions are 
not provided for and hence in line with the Treaty a joint position of the chambers will be 
necessary (Poland). Yet, because most of the studied national systems introduced a distinct 
parliamentary veto on the government’s decision in the Council, the need for a joint position of 
both chambers under Article 48(7)(3) might be rather rare.
64
 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES OF INTERPARLIAMENTARY 
COOPERATION 
Both types of the treaty revision procedure focus on an individual parliament. First, the 
simplified revision procedure on the basis of Article 48(6) TEU refers to the approval by the 
member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, which includes an 
approval by a national parliament. Second, the general passerelle is directly oriented towards an 
individual parliament by granting it a right to opposition. In fact, both of the simplified treaty 
revision types allow a single parliament to stop revisions of the Treaties: an approval by all 
Member States is necessary for the entry into force of an approved European Council decision in 
the first case and the European Council may adopt a decision only ‘[i]n the absence of 
opposition’ of national parliaments in the second case. These cases are also different from the 
EWS. Although the EWS allows a national parliament to draft a reasoned opinion on subsidiarity 
violation grounds, it does not grant opposition rights to individual parliaments unless certain 
thresholds of numbers of reasoned opinions are met. An element of similarity between the EWS 
and the simplified treaty revision procedure is however that both grant national parliaments a 
‘negative’ blocking role in the EU decision-making process, in contrast to proposing their own 
initiatives.
65
 How can we hence reconcile the single-parliament-centered and negative role of 
national legislatures with the possibility of interparliamentary cooperation? 
Interparliamentary cooperation seems to play an important role post-Lisbon. Crum and Fossum 
note a growing trend of cooperation within the ‘multilevel parliamentary field’ encompassing 
national and supranational parliamentary institutions participating in the EU decision-making 
process.
66
 Their assessment of this cooperation is positive: as ‘parliaments are increasingly 
oriented to one another; each is becoming an intrinsic part of the others’ operating 
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environment’.67 The interparliamentary networks are distributed according to bilateral-
multilateral and formal-informal lines.
68
 This chapter will focus on multilateral networks, 
including formal and informal networks which can offer relevant forums of interparliamentary 
cooperation by simplified revision procedures. 
First, the EU Speaker’s Conference aims at ‘safeguarding and promoting the role of parliaments 
and carrying out common work in support of the interparliamentary activities’.69 It meets at least 
once a year and involves the speakers of parliaments of EU Member States and the EP’s 
President.
70
 The Interparliamentary EU information exchange, IPEX, was created in 2006 
following the recommendations of this conference.
71
  Since June 2011, when the new version of 
the IPEX platform was launched, it includes inter alia a possibility for national parliaments to 
make known its opposition in accordance with Article 48(7) TEU and 81(3) TFEU. The second 
relevant forum for parliamentary cooperation from the perspective of this chapter is the 
Conference of the EU affairs committees of the national parliaments and the representatives of 
the EP (COSAC). The COSAC, as indicated in Article 10 of Protocol No. 1, ‘promote[s] the 
exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European 
Parliament’. Third, the informal network of the permanent representatives of the national 
parliaments in the EP (NPRs) ‘facilitate[s] informal, day-to-day cooperation,’72and provides 
information to national members of the parliament on EU issues.
73
 Specifically, NPRs report on 
EU developments and political issues on a weekly basis or ad hoc on urgent matters or such 
matters that are interesting only for a limited number of MPs.
74
 Högenauer and Neuhold indicate 
that national representatives play a representational function, by building relationships between 
members of parliaments and EU institutions, such as organizing visits of national MPs to the EP, 
liaising with the national MEPs or participating in inter-parliamentary conferences.
75
 Finally, 
NPRs enable a ‘bridge-building function across national parliaments’ by directly exchanging 
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information across national parliaments about the stance of their national parliament on a 
specific issue.
76
 This was already visible in the case of cooperation for gaining enough votes to 
trigger a ‘yellow card’ against the Monti II proposal under the EWS where the NPRs played a 
leading and effective role.
77
 
 
The following section explores the possible fora and ways of interparliamentary cooperation by 
national parliaments within the simplified revision procedure. The sections below will elaborate 
on these issues taking the amendment of Article 136 TFEU as a case study. 
V. CASE STUDY OF ARTICLE 136 TFEU AMENDMENT  
 
In October 2010, at the time of the deep Eurozone crisis, EU Heads of State or Government 
agreed that Member States should establish ‘a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole’ in order to ensure balanced and sustainable growth 
in the EU.’78 To this effect, ‘a limited treaty change was required’, yet without modifying Article 
125 TFEU (the so-called ‘no bail-out’ clause).79 In December 2010, the Belgian government put 
forward a proposal for revising Article 136 TFEU concerning the adoption of measures for Euro-
zone Member States by the Council ensuring the functioning of economic and monetary union. 
In March 2011, within the simplified revision procedure under Article 48(6) TEU the European 
Council adopted Decision 2011/199 to amend Article 136 TFEU accordingly.
80
 The newly 
inserted paragraph 3 states that ‘Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as 
a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made 
subject to strict conditionality’. 
The question whether the requirements of Article 48(6) TEU for a valid treaty amendment were 
met was subject to the judicial review by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) within the 
procedure of preliminary reference from the Supreme Court of Ireland.
81
Specifically, the ECJ 
had to review whether the amendment concerned provision of Title III of TFEU and whether it 
did not increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. With regard to the first 
matter, the ECJ stated that while the Decision 2011/199 amends a provision of Part Three of the 
TFEU (Article 136 TFEU) it ‘formally satisfies’ the condition imposed by Article 48(6) TEU 
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that the simplified revision procedure may concern solely provisions of that treaty part,
82
 and in 
addition, does not affect any other provision of the Treaty, especially in Part One in the area of 
monetary policy.
83
 Regarding the increase of competence condition, the Court found that 
Decision 2011/119 in itself does not confer any new competence on the EU and does not create a 
legal basis which would enable the EU to undertake an action which was not possible before the 
amendment.
84
 In sum, the ECJ declared Decision 2011/199 valid. 
In the meantime, following Article 48(6) TEU, the Decision 2011/199 required approval by 
member states ‘in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’ in order to enter 
into force.
85
The need for parliamentary cooperation with regard to the Article 136 TFEU 
amendment arose at the point of the approval procedures due to the complexity of the Eurozone 
related reforms at the time. The issue at stake was that in addition to the revision of the Lisbon 
Treaty, two new inter-governmental treaties were also agreed to and put for ratification. The first 
of them, the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism launches a new financial 
institution, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) ‘to mobilise funding and provide stability 
support under strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to 
the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing 
problems, if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of 
its Member States’.86 Although the ESM Treaty was ‘closely intertwined’ with the amendment of 
Article 136 TFEU,
87
 the ECJ underlined in its Pringle judgment that Member States may 
conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty before the entry into force of Decision 2011/199.
88
 Second, 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) signed enshrining the so-called 
fiscal compact with a requirement for national budgets that the annual structural government 
deficit does not exceed 0.5% of GDP at market prices was under ratification at the same time as 
the amendment of Article 136 TFEU.
89
 
The highly relevant issues of the financial crisis that the Lisbon Treaty amendment and the two 
new treaties dealt with and the complexity of the approval and ratification processes of three 
different legal instruments made it difficult for national parliaments to understand the scope of 
change. In order not to stay in the dark about the relevant issues surrounding the new legal 
mechanisms directed against the Eurozone crisis, some interparliamentary cooperation was 
initiated in order to gather information and monitor the ratification process. The idea to launch 
interparliamentary cooperation was a ‘consensual decision’ addressing many requests that the 
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national parliamentary representatives received from national parliaments (especially the French 
parliament, the German Bundestag and the Portuguese parliament), institutions and academia.
90
 
On the side of the NPRs in Brussels the idea of creating a special database containing all the 
relevant information on the state of play within the ratification of Article 136 TFEU amendment, 
but also the ESM and the TSCG Treaty was especially pursued by the representatives of the 
Austrian, Portuguese and Spanish parliaments in Brussels.
91
 This database was being updated ‘in 
real time’ by the respective national parliamentary representatives in Brussels, reflecting the 
status of ratification of the Article 136 TFEU, ESM Treaty and the TSCG. In this respect, the 
database was useful for the parliaments in order to know ‘whether the ratification of the 
European Council decision or of the new treaties was high on the agenda in a specific national 
parliament’.92 At the same time, the EP AFCO committee kept, in cooperation with, among 
others NPRs in Brussels, its own database which was following the ratification processes at 
national level.
93
 In sum, the exchange of information was ‘intensive’ and presented a ‘good 
rehearsal of interparliamentary cooperation in real time’.94 
In contrast to this, COSAC did not seem to function as a relevant forum for interparliamentary 
cooperation during the amendment of Article 136 TFEU. The revision of the Treaties was not an 
item on the COSAC agenda and remained only on the sidelines of the proceedings. For example, 
the XLV COSAC’s ordinary meeting in May 2011 in Hungary and the XLVII COSAC 
Chairpersons’ meeting in January 2012 in Copenhagen discussed Eurozone crisis related 
issues.
95
 However, none of the COSAC Bi-annual reports addressed the question of Article 136 
TFEU amendment.
96
 
In the same vein, the Conference of the Speakers of EU Parliaments did not address the Article 
136 TFEU amendment. In contrast, the ratification of the TSCG Treaty was an important point 
on the agenda of the conference: the participants ‘shared information on the ratification of the 
Treaty and the implementation of its provisions in Member States’.97 
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In sum, as the current practice of interparliamentary cooperation shows with regard to the EWS, 
the network of the permanent representatives of the national parliaments in Brussels remains the 
crucial forum. 
VI. CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOOD FUNCTIONING OF THE EU  
 
Article 12 TEU states that ‘[n]ational parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of 
the Union’ and lists specific functions of national parliaments from the Lisbon Treaty, including 
both themes of this contribution: participation in the revision procedures of the Treaties, in 
accordance with Article 48 TEU, and participation in interparliamentary cooperation between 
national parliaments and with the EP, in accordance with Protocol No.1. As argued by Kiiver, 
although oddly drafted, Article 12 TEU presents ‘an attempt to upgrade the visibility of national 
parliaments in a prominent part of the EU Treaty’.98 
Yet, what is much more at stake here than the visibility of parliaments is that their participation 
is meaningful for the EU decision-making process, with an important, useful quality or purpose. 
In a sense this is much more visible in the EWS where the reasoned opinions may lead to 
changes in the draft legislative acts proposed by the Commission, at different stages of the 
process. Similarly, interparliamentary cooperation in the EWS turned out to be very useful for 
reaching the ‘yellow card’ thresholds. In contrast the involvement of national parliaments in both 
types of the simplified revision procedures has a much more ex-post character, since the 
parliaments participate in the approval of an amendment or can oppose to an already drafted 
initiative of the European Council. Nonetheless, the position of national parliaments in these 
procedures is much more powerful and individualistic than under the EWS, as even a single 
parliament can block the entire amendment procedure. In this sense the participation of 
parliaments has very serious consequences.  
The simplified revision procedure can be meaningfully enhanced by the interparliamentary 
cooperation, which was depicted in the case of the Article 136 TFEU amendment, where the 
cooperation focused on the exchange of information ‘in real time’ on highly complex issues of 
the Eurozone crisis. Although it might be hard to measure the impact of interparliamentary 
cooperation in the case at stake, in fact, the approval of the European Council decision was 
successful. Interparliamentary cooperation in this field may hence offer a counterbalance to the 
negative role of parliaments in the revision of the Treaties by sharing information on the stage of 
the amendment process and enhancing the understanding of the complex revision procedures, 
such as in the area of the Eurozone crisis. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has studied the role of national parliaments within the simplified revision 
procedures of Article 48(6) and 48(7) TEU. These new provisions introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty grant individual parliaments a prominent role in the revision of the Treaties. Specifically, 
under Article 48(6) TEU, an amendment enters into force only if approved according to national 
constitutional requirements, which in the current EU involves a national legislature in all the 
member states. Similarly, within the general passerelle of Article 48(7) TEU, a successful 
revision demands that none of the national parliaments opposes to the procedural change in the 
decision making process.  
The overview of different national designs of the simplified revision procedures shows some 
divergence mostly in the approval of the ‘general passerelle’ at national level. Specifically, the 
studied jurisdictions Germany, Poland, Italy and France (except for the UK) provided for the 
general passerelle by adopting national provisions to this effect. However, in addition to that the 
UK, Germany and Poland introduced a requirement of parliamentary statute necessary for the 
relevant national representative to vote in favour of the passerelle in the European Council.  
This chapter has also studied the possibility for national parliaments to cooperate within the 
simplified revision procedures. As the example of the Article 136 TFEU amendment shows, 
national parliaments did pursue an increased exchange of information with regard to the approval 
of the new provision. The exchange helped national parliaments to follow ‘in real time’ the 
complex issues around different Eurozone related changes, namely the ESM Treaty and the 
TSCG, which were under ratification in addition to the Article 136 TFEU amendment. Finally, 
such interparliamentary cooperation seems to contribute to the good functioning of the EU as 
expressed in Article 12 TEU, by offering a meaningful way for parliaments to participate in the 
revision process as informed actors, as well as providing a counterbalance to the rather negative 
blocking role of national parliaments in the revision process. 
